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On Queer Theory and Erotophobia

Can queer theory be erotophobic? This book proceeds from the perplexing observation that for
all of its political agita, rhetorical virtuosity, and intellectual restlessness, queer theory conforms to
a model of erotic life that is psychologically conservative and narrow. Even after several decades
of combative, dazzling, irreverent queer critical thought, the field remains far from grasping
that sexuality’s radical potential lies in its being understood as “exogenous, intersubjective and
intrusive” (Laplanche). In particular, and despite the pervasiveness and popularity of recent calls
to deconstruct the ideological foundations of contemporary queer thought, no study has as
yet considered or in any way investigated the singular role of psychology in shaping the field’s
conceptual impasses and politico-ethical limitations.
Through close readings of key thinkers in queer theoretical thought—Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Leo Bersani, Lee Edelman, Judith Butler, Lauren Berlant, and Jane Gallop—Homo Psyche
introduces metapsychology as a new dimension of analysis vis-à-vis the theories of French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche, who insisted on “new foundations for psychoanalysis” that radically
departed from existing Freudian and Lacanian models of the mind. Staging this intervention,
Ashtor deepens current debates about the future of queer studies by demonstrating how the
field’s systematic neglect of metapsychology as a necessary and independent realm of ideology
ultimately enforces the complicity of queer studies with psychological conventions that are
fundamentally erotophobic and therefore inimical to queer theory’s radical and ethical project.

HOMO PSYCHE

“Gila Ashtor’s Homo Psyche is a bold and ambitious attempt to rethink
the foundations of contemporary queer theory beyond its customary
psyche versus anti-psyche (or psychoanalysis versus anti-psychoanalysis)
divisions. The need to transcend these pointless divisions—which lead
to paralyzing intellectual impasses—is undoubtedly an urgent task. In
this sense, Ashtor’s book is a timely and astute intervention.”
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Two Girls2: Sedgwick + Berlant, Relational
and Queer

Queer Relationality?
To readers familiar with the anti-relational topoi of queer studies, it
may seem necessary to justify this final chapter’s inquiry into the topic of
relationality. After all, wouldn’t the field’s proud antipathy toward relationality’s familiar tropes testify to a widely held disinterest in what people do together, or what it means and why it matters? And yet, what are
the stakes of queering subjectivity if sex-without-the-mess-of-otherness
is all that’s finally achieved? Besides, if we have learned with Laplanche
that sexuality originates in relation to others, by a process of involuntary
relating that we can neither master, coincide with, nor avoid, what kind of
queerness imagines it can celebrate sexuality by dismissing its constitutive relationality? In their recent dialogue, Sex, or the Unbearable, Lauren
Berlant and Lee Edelman undertake to theorize relationality as a separable sphere of experience by locating “sex” as one scene among many of
“relations that overwhelm and anchor us”1 and suggesting an approach to
“the scene of relationality” as a category of encounters that “disturbs the
presumption of sovereignty . . . specifically, an encounter with the
estrangement and intimacy of being in relation. Sex is exemplary in the
way it powerfully induces such encounters, but such encounters exceed
those experiences we recognize as sex” (viii). This avowal of “relationality” as a capacious term that includes, but is not reducible to, a certain
kind of psycho-sexual encounter, offers a way into this chapter’s exposition
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of the relationship between queerness and relationality, and specifically,
what relationality has to do with self-transformation.
I begin by exploring how efforts in contemporary critical and literary
theory to explain the complex relational experiences of psychic subjectivities can be traced back to an unreflective reliance on applied Lacanian psychoanalysis as its only and ultimate interpretive apparatus. The
chapter ends by drawing on Laplanche’s radical innovations in metapsychology to develop new narrative trajectories for how knowledge is, relationally, transmitted and transformative. At this chapter’s center is my
encounter with Mary Gaitskill’s novel, Two Girls, Fat and Thin, and Lauren Berlant’s essay on Gaitskill’s novel of the same name, “Two Girls, Fat
and Thin.” And because I first discovered this text while Berlant was my
teacher and I was her student, and because this is an essay on relationality,
at the center of my critical encounter with Gaitskill is also my pedagogic
encounter with Berlant.
Although the particular “girls” named by the dyad vary depending on
whether it is Gaitskill’s novel (Dorothy/Justine), Berlant’s essay (Lauren/
Eve), or my chapter (Student/Teacher), in every iteration the expression
“two girls” functions as a formulation of the relationship between two
girls in the moment of some kind of learning. Although Gaitskill has a
distinctive oeuvre in contemporary American literature as an author of
sexually and psychologically subversive fiction, and Berlant is unique in
her prominence as a leading influential critic in both queer and affect
theory, Two Girls is unusual among Gaitskill’s works for using each girl’s
different relationship to a transformative teacher as the context for drawing out whatever intimacy they already or eventually share, and Berlant’s
essay is not an intervention in Gaitskill’s critical reception so much as an
occasion to reflect on the relationship between trauma and history via her
own intimacy with, and juxtaposition to, fellow queer/affect theorist Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick. That is, rather than being exemplary of each thinker’s
abiding formal or thematic interests, “two girls” has the status of being
unusual in each thinker’s repertoire. (Gaitskill has two protagonists who
take turns narrating the story, instead of one, and Berlant, who avowedly
resists the tropes of self-experience, threads her close reading through
autobiography.) My choice of these “atypical” texts magnified the curiosity of my own critical agenda: After all, even though I might find a clever
way to justify these object choices, there is, perhaps, the crude arithmetic
embarrassment that by the time one counts my own trauma/history as
well as my own pedagogic relation to Berlant, there are enough traumatized girls in any given sentence to feel uneasy and discouraged about the
chances that critique can be anything other than a feat of extraordinary
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sublimation. In the name of high theory, I often found myself wondering:
How many “two girls” is too many girls?
By this I mean that I was suspicious of my motives. After all, isn’t it
unequivocally the case that nothing quite screams Oedipal rivalry like a
younger thinker writing critically about an older one? In fact, for months
the ostensible obviousness of this rhetorical/interpersonal act deterred
me from approaching these texts. All I could think was that in my
endeavor to problematize existing models of pedagogic transformation,
I challenged my own teacher’s explanatory paradigm, and, in so doing,
didn’t my radical critique of anxious influence sink before it ever sailed?
Harold Bloom has most forcefully linked these terms together when, in
The Anxiety of Influence (1973), all relations between younger and older
poets could be explicable as some version of the paternal drama and all
creative difference as agonistic overthrowing. Maternalizing this dynamic
hasn’t done much to radically challenge the explanatory hegemony of
Freud’s metapsychological account. That is, even where attempts have
been made to imagine a softer, daughterly push between women—insofar
as it presumes the familiar psychoanalytic teleology of transformation—
such attempts invariably retain the symbolic coordinates of an Oedipal
showdown.
Naturally, I bristled at the reduction of critical thought to such primitive psychological gestures, as if the need to compete, defy, or overcome
my teacher offered an appropriate explanation for my argument or object
choices. I grew sometimes weary, sometimes hysterical, to notice how
defensive my every self-justifications seemed (there’s no such thing as
objectivity! critique is hardly the most efficient means of differentiation! difference is a tribute not a method of retaliation!). It wasn’t difficult to concede that I was probably squeamish about my ambition, and aggression,
but even when I allowed that this was something I probably needed to
work through, a theoretical problem nagged at me: What was the distinctiveness of pedagogic relationality if self-transformation was always and
only a reaction to the parental bond? And then I realized: What kind of
motivational paradigm situates the relationship before the psychic events
it enables? Wasn’t the incoherence of these tropes, and critical theory’s
uncritical deployment of them, precisely the object of this critique? By
using an idea of paternity as the template for all development, the Freudian/Bloomian topos of transformation generates a confused model of
psychic motivation that somehow treats all the contortions of becoming as
a reaction against relating rather than emblematic of how the pedagogic
form is itself already the response to a constellation of common, overlapping, questions. Enforcing linear causality belies the distinctiveness of
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transformational phenomena. As a result, equating each figure in the
dyad with its ostensibly transparent chronological position arrantly and
incongruously misplaces how the motivation to relate comes from the
experience of having one’s own knowledge challenged and provoked by
its dynamic relation to the knowledge of another.
And so, what if intellectual filiation did not need, necessarily, to culminate in the declared supersession of someone else’s thought but could
become instead the occasion for elaborating impact and relation? I want
my way of reading to be a practice in the relating I seek to describe. That
said, reading and relating are not an opposition here. This chapter is an
argument that uses style to put pressure on how kinship is conceptualized
by staging teacher-student relationality as both a topic and an experience
of relating. Berlant refers to the unique potential of performative theory
when she writes, “Reimagining forms of relation entails imagining new
genres of experience” (ix) and it is to further elaborate this connection
between theoretical writing and relational engagement that my encounter with Berlant takes the form it does here. Throughout, I want what I’ll
be calling “resonance”—the kinetic force that registers relation—to
appear legible yet apart from relationality’s existing tropological forms.
This is, I believe, the dehiscence that Berlant shows us Gaitskill enables,
and that Berlant uses Lacan to stitch closed.

Reading Berlant Reading Two Girls
Lauren Berlant’s essay, “Two Girls, Fat and Thin,” about Mary Gaitskill’s
novel of the same name is a powerful account of the connection between
imagining alternative relational modes that are not reducible to conventional plots of desire and belonging, and understanding psychic subjectivities as too functionally incoherent and structurally inconsistent to
be assimilated into dominant paradigms of attachment, history and
sociality.2 The novel tells the story of two girls who, in different but formally similar ways, are each abused by those who are entrusted with loving them, embody their damaged psyches through an array of compulsive
fixations, and in varying degrees of rage, lethargy, and disappointment
negate psychic itineraries that promise either redemption or cure. Summarizing the book’s psychic-affective landscape, Berlant writes:
Justine’s response to Dorothy is at first like Dorothy’s to her—a desire
to tell a hard story to a stranger to whom she feels averse, followed
by confusion about that impulse lived as ambivalence toward the
person who animates it. Far more impersonal than Dorothy, Justine
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has a slower emotional metabolism (yet Dorothy is the fat one, Justine the thin), but eventually she returns to Dorothy, sensing that
Dorothy knows something that Justine cannot bear to know on her
own. This meeting and return frame the book. . . . We witness them
growing up paralyzed by fear and at the same time launching into
madnesses of thinking, reading, eating, masturbating, attaching, and
fucking. . . . If she wants a good life, what’s a girl, or two girls, to do?
When does the doing matter? (29)
The two girls of the novel meet through a shared interest in Anna Granite,
the once famous and hypnotic Ayn Rand–like leader of a social and intellectual movement/cult called Definitism. Dorothy was infatuated with
Granite and had left college to work for her, and Justine is now writing an
article about her. With the prospective article as the novel’s organizing
center, the story traces the awkward conversations between these two
girls who, except for a common investment in Granite, are strangers to
each other. The girls keep meeting to discuss Dorothy’s firsthand experience of Granite as a teacher/leader and repeatedly find themselves
instead, or in parallel, swapping stories about their lives. But rather than
eventually maturing into a more typical or recognizable genre of relating,
the intimacy between these girls extends without ever quite graduating
into a “normal” form. Much like “fat” and “thin” of the novel’s title, each
girl seems to retain their essential size and shape throughout the novel as
if to literalize that they never merge into a unit/couple, nor that either girl
ever loses or gains any weight from having taken in the other. This homeostatic situation threatens to buckle under the pressure of the novel’s end
when Dorothy feels betrayed and enraged by the scathing article Justine
has written on Definitism and goes to Justine’s house to confront her, but
instead interrupts a dangerous S/M encounter, scares the guy away, and
rather than unleashing her meticulous diatribe, takes Justine’s naked,
wounded body into her arms. But then, instead of climax or a breakthrough, they rest together and fall asleep.
The novel’s ending “is not a lesbian ending, exactly,” Berlant writes,
“since exhaustion is neither sex, love, nor object choice,” but it is “not
nothing, it’s something else” (152). This is just one example of Berlant’s
indefatigable commitment to protect the possibility of perplexing subtlety in strange and sometimes bewildering personal and interpersonal
moments from the critic’s interpretive overreach. One way that Berlant
navigates this critical project is by continually breathing air into dominant explanatory frameworks, coaxing her peers to try (at least once?)
trading their attachment to certainty for thought-experiments with
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non-coherence. In one such characteristic moment, Berlant writes: “In
this habit of representing the intentional subject, a manifest lack of self-
cultivating attention can easily become recast as irresponsibility, shallowness, resistance, refusal, or incapacity; and habit itself can begin to
look deeply overmeaningful, such that addiction, reaction formation,
conventional gesture clusters, or just being different can be read as heroic
placeholders for resistance to something, affirmation of something, or a
transformative desire.”3 For Berlant, it could never be critically responsible to merely impugn people for trying, in her words, to “stay afloat” in
the world under conditions of precarity and near-chronic oppression, nor
could the epistemological comfort of any simple anti-formalism explain
with any generosity or ingenuity how a subject can be something other
than “performatively sovereign,” not “deeply overmeaningful” and whose
ways of being may be something else than “heroic placeholders for resistance to something, affirmation of something, or a transformative desire.”
Berlant unrelentingly deshames the value (and necessity) of binding oneself to a life raft by insisting that any analysis involving what people do to
survive must seek out language that strives to capture the infinite subtlety
of experiential encounters. In this way, Berlant keeps showing that no
matter how sophisticatedly posed, assailing attachment for being “ideological” leads too readily and inevitably to judging people’s effort to manage their lives—and bolstering with it the ideological apparatus it seeks to
critique. By disrupting the putative “straight” line from ideology to a person’s complex self-experience, Berlant’s writing relentlessly avoids precisely the vulgar Marxist/Foucauldian relationship to ideology that we
observed in Butler’s totalizing conflation of “gender” with the Law, making Berlant one of the most deft psychologists in queer studies today.
Perhaps because of the idiosyncratic way that the personal/psychological and social/ideological are inextricably interdependent in Berlant’s
analysis, her work exemplifies the field’s most sophisticated attempt to
articulate the kind of subject that is at once “historical” and “psychological.” Taking into account the Marxist and Foucauldian assaults on the
myth of sovereign “individuality,” Berlant locates her own approach to
subjectivity somewhere in between the extremes of naïve psychological
realism, on the one hand, and posthumanist abolitions of the subject on
the other. This sense of her “between-ness” is not incidental to how she
elaborates her critical position; rather than through polemic or critique,
Berlant’s particular approach unfolds through staged juxtapositions to
the “strong” positions of other critics. In “Two Girls,” Berlant’s “impersonality” emerges in contrast to Sedgwick’s commitment to the “person,”
whereas in Sex, or the Unbearable, Berlant’s belief in relational repair
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stands out in contradistinction to the hard edges of Edelman’s anti-
relationality. Therefore, Berlant’s position “between” the extremes of relationality/anti-relationality—less personal than Sedgwick, more relational
than Edelman—makes her work among the closest that contemporary
critical theory comes to using the close-reading of a text in order to
endeavor a defense of what motivates people to do whatever weird and
confusing things they do, in the paradoxical and inexplicable ways they
do it.4 Berlant’s wariness of the “overmeaningful” and “performatively
sovereign” subject challenges the way psychology is typically deployed,
where “a manifest lack of self-cultivating attention can easily become
recast as irresponsibility, shallowness, resistance, refusal, or incapacity.”5
In so doing, her work can be seen to complement and powerfully extend
the range of queer and affect theory’s critical mission to unhinge psychological acts and identities from habituated tropes of a normativizing
interpretive determinism. But what I mean to show in reading the two
readings of Berlant’s essay—her reading of Gaitskill’s novel and her own
relationship to Sedgwick—is that although Berlant’s analytic practice is
rigorously less deterministic than conventional mobilizations of theory,
the version of psychoanalysis it uses renders it ultimately no less relationally determined. Put another way, the anti-“personal,” “anti-meaningful”
approach Berlant mobilizes as a defense of critical nuance leads to an
impoverished conceptualization of subjectivity that uniformly fails to
explain the psychological transformations that occur as a result of complex, intimate relationality. As an alternative to Berlant’s applied Lacanianism, I develop Laplanche’s concept of “reactivation” to propose a
theory of “textuality” that foregrounds relationality as the foundation of
subjectivity.
I will be exploring how Berlant’s essay simultaneously elaborates the
superabundance of what connects people to one another and refuses to
allow the specificity of those connections to matter. Throughout her tour
de force dilation of the ways all four girls are brought into relation, Berlant’s essay performs being transformed by particular others while at the
same time insisting on transformation as the formal effect of non-
relational encounters. Given her singular purchase on the way interiority
and ideology are inextricably linked, Berlant wants to emphasize that
relationships can be powerful without being over-determined by heteronormative tropes of kinship. For example, the way Berlant describes
meeting Sedgwick (“She gave a paper, and we talked about it. Years later,
I gave one, and she listened to it. She wrote another book, and I read it”)
versus her account of being impacted by her (“For me, though, the luck of
encountering her grandiosity . . . is of unsurpassable consequence”)
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seems deliberately to choreograph as a tension how little you can “know”
the other person versus how transformed by them you can become. De-
dramatization as a stylistic device is a powerful antidote to the inflated
narratives of true love and true selves, love that occurs at first sight and
the kind that completes you. But whereas Gaitskill amplifies the girls’
entanglement to intensify epistemological pressure, Berlant collapses
indeterminacy and structuralism to abrogate the question of what brings
and holds these girls together.
Applying Lacan and the “poetics of méconnaisance,” Berlant turns
each girl into a “placeholder” that “they take personally but that has, in a
sense, nothing to do with anything substantive about each other, except
insofar as each woman functions formally as an enigmatic opportunity
for something transformative” (“Two Girls, Fat and Thin,” 127).6 Indeed,
only a paragraph earlier Berlant points out that the girls’ names, Dorothy
Never and Justine Shade, are “shades of The Wizard of Oz, Pale Fire, and
Justine” and in the accompanying footnote, that the novel’s literary history “requires a story of its own.” But this reference to Nabokov and
repetition of “shade” might signal more than just the novel’s general literariness and indicate instead a more substantial connection between
Gaitskill and Nabokov’s fictional projects. It is, after all, with a passage
from a different Nabokov text that Gaitskill’s own novel begins: “All one
could do was to glimpse, amid the haze and chimeras, something real
ahead, just as persons endowed with unusual persistence of diurnal cerebration are able to perceive in their deepest sleep, somewhere beyond the
throes of an entangled and inept nightmare, the ordered reality of the
waking hour.”7 We are reminded here that Nabokov’s technical virtuosity
is singularly focused on tracking his obsession with the occult underpinnings of human behavior. Not only is Nabokov’s oeuvre distinguished
for its experimental preoccupations with doppelgangers (a pair of
Nabokovian “two girls” might really be “one”?) but this prefatory passage
expressly establishes the provocative dissonance between what we see
and what we follow.
Therefore, although Berlant’s essay captures and recreates the rich panoply of relational dyads and dynamics, it does so in order to repeatedly
hollow out the relational mechanisms of any meaningful content, and to
systematically insist that what underlies relationality must be either
determinable or “hav[e] nothing to do with anything substantive about
each other” (127). This repudiation of “anything substantive” is an extreme
alternative to exegetic density; the choice between a claustrophobic
hermeneutics and a permissive one is an ultimatum that prefigures Berlant’s conflation of biography with psychology in the context of a text that
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seems so deliberately and with such virtuosity to crank up the tension
between “everygirl” and peculiar ones, oracular forces and the mundane.
The Marxist observation that even generic types can have eccentric variations seems insufficiently able to explain the novel’s experimental logic
because, instead of recuperating agency, it dramatizes the powerlessness,
awkwardness, and erotics with which people are moved toward others
for reasons that are strong and yet just out of perceptual reach. Berlant’s
reading is exemplary of the limited critical imagination with which contemporary theory, and affect/queer theory specifically, approaches relationality. Although, as it pertains to these questions, I mostly treat affect/
queer theory as a homogenous discourse, this chapter traces a fundamental difference between Sedgwick and Berlant that Berlant’s use of “two
girls” as a narrative frame both addresses and absorbs. Specifically, what I
think this analysis will show is that in the name of resisting a kind of pre-
structuralist psychoanalytic determinism, relationality, as a mechanism,
has been drained of any material and psychological force and diffused
instead into an empty “happening” that can determine everything that
transpires around it without ever being accessible or worthy of curiosity
and definition.

Theorizing Relationality in Queer/Affect Theory
If any discourse has seemed interested and equipped to offer a corrective to the limitations of a conventional, and conventionally deterministic, psychoanalytic interpretive regime, affect theory has been the most
promising—not least because it uses as its founding text the essay by Eve
Sedgwick and Adam Frank, “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading
Silvan Tomkins,” in which Tomkins’s research on “affect” is hailed as the
much-
needed alternative to critical theory’s overly psychoanalytic,
insufficiently nuanced paradigms of human need and action.8 Indeed,
among queer theorists, Sedgwick has arguably done the most to try
unmooring sexuality studies from its “trieb”-centered Freudian base. In
Touching Feeling, Sedgwick writes, “The post-Romantic ‘power/knowledge’ regime that Foucault analyzes, the one that structures and propagates the repressive hypothesis, follows the Freudian understanding that
one physiological drive—sexuality, libido, desire—is the ultimate source,
and hence in Foucault’s word is seen to embody the ‘truth,’ of human
motivation, identity, and emotion.”9 Using Tomkins’s affect theory to dislodge the “one physiological drive,” Sedgwick and Frank show that as a
fierce critic of Freudian drive theory, Tomkins long ago insisted on untying the knots made by confusing biological needs with emotional ones.
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As Tomkins writes, “In the concepts of orality, the hunger drive mechanism was confused with the dependency-communion complex, which
from the beginning is more general than the need for food and the situation of being fed. In the concept of anality, the elimination drive mechanism had been confused with the contempt-shame humiliation complex.
. . . While it is true that oral, anal, and sexual aspects of these complexes
are deeply disturbing and central to the psychopathology of many individuals, aspects not emphasized by Freud are more disturbing and more
central to the psychopathology of others.”10 Although Tomkins does not
directly address “relating” as a distinctive psychological mechanism, one
reason his work has the quality of a breakthrough is its reorientation away
from the tendency to theorize the subject in isolation and toward its
imbrication in affective states, the environment, and others.
Sedgwick’s use of Tomkins to insist on a new and different motivational
structure avowedly compels a reevaluation of dominant explanatory models. While this call for nuance is not aimed at relationality specifically, the
critical exasperation with “over-meaningful” accounts of psychic action,
and interpretive limitedness more generally, promises fresh attention to
dimensions of experience that have until now been systematically neglected.
In their introduction to The Affect Theory Reader, Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth write:
Almost all of the tried-and-true handholds and footholds for so
much critical-cultural-philosophical inquiry and for theory—
subject/object, representation and meaning, rationality, consciousness, time and space, inside/outside, human/nonhuman, identity,
structure, background/foreground, and so forth—become decidedly
less sure and more nonsequential. . . . Because affect emerges out of
muddy, unmediated relatedness and not in some dialectical reconciliation of cleanly oppositional elements of primary units, it makes
easy compartmentalisms give way to thresholds and tensions, blends
and blurs.11
As the writing and thinking in this passage illustrates, affect theory is
characterized by a language of sensation, of “thresholds and tensions,
blends and blurs,” that eludes dominant critical “compartmentalisms”
and that in doing so insists upon the “muddy, unmediated relatedness” of
belonging in the world. This is an incredibly powerful framework, or slipping out from under what with a capital “F” becomes a “framework’s”
noose, that testifies to the imaginative and pragmatic opportunities made
possible by having “no single, generalizable theory of affect” (3).
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Indeed, in keeping with its multidisciplinary resources and commitment to expanding the critical and perceptual range of our interpretive
practices, affect theory has a robust theoretical apparatus for reconceptualizing the relational context. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy exerts one of the most crucial influences in this discursive
landscape. Not only did Merleau-Ponty seek to undermine Cartesian
mind-body dualism by demonstrating that all knowledge was necessarily
“embodied,” but his work on perception and psychology further demonstrates that all knowledge is not representational. Teresa Brennan’s “transmission of affect” is extraordinarily helpful in further elucidating the
conceptual consequences of reorienting our dominant physiological-
psychological divide. Brennan writes, “The taken-for-grantedness of the
emotionally contained subject is a residual bastion of Eurocentrism in
critical thinking” and what “the transmission of affect means [is] that we
are not self-contained in terms of our energies. There is no secure distinction between the ‘individual’ and the ‘environment.’ ”12 This insecure distinction “between the ‘individual’ and the ‘environment’ ” is so important
for Brennan because it opens up a whole new language for tracking
embodied experience; “rather than the generational line of inheritance
(the vertical line of history), the transmission of affect, conceptually, presupposes a horizontal line of transmission” via “olfaction and the circulation of blood,” hormones, facial expressions, touch. One major claim
resulting from this project is that perception is not contingent on representation; or put another way, what we sense of our/another’s affect or
experience does not need to be representable in order to be perceptually
operative.
Although opening the door to materialism can often sound like it
slams the door on language, one of my points in this essay is not that
affect gets us away from discourse, but that affect theory diversifies our
analytic tools by focusing on a world of forces and impacts that are not
reducible to, or identical with, those thematized by the structuralist
paradigm.13 This intellectual development seemed to me like an especially promising innovation for theorizing subjectivity, and metapsychology generally, because it put back at the center of analysis a rigorous
respect for the singular dimensions of experiential life that are necessary to elucidating why, for example, people become the people they do,
and how that happened. I realize that “materialism” as it is typically
mobilized in philosophical discourse refers to “real-world” concerns
like capitalism or the ecological crisis rather than phenomena in a subject’s psychological life, but one of this essay’s organizing contentions is
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that a narrow conceptualization of materiality (one that derogates psychology to immateriality) or of subjectivity (one that does not consider
the conditions for transformation to be material in nature or effect) limits the radical potential of realist philosophy to change how existence in
the lifeworld is thought and lived.
Coextensive with my conviction that metapsychological questions are
integral to any materialist philosophical system is my interest in literary
criticism as a “practical psychology.” By this I mean that because the exercise of close reading is charged with the task of interpreting human action
as it occurs in narrative form, a psychology of the subject is never abstract,
or incidental to, the explanatory power of hermeneutic engagement.
Therefore, for example, rather than looking for a logical flaw in Lacan’s
theorization of subjectivity, I consider how an applied-Lacanian reading
reveals what may be missing in Lacan’s theoretical system. Throughout, I
draw upon Laplanche’s theoretical interventions to consider how the
models of subjectivity currently in use mitigate any sustained critical
awareness of psycho-sexuality as intrusive, exogenous and originating in
the material “other.” It follows from my avowedly idiosyncratic use of literary criticism that I do not begin with any established theory of the subject but rather read closely trying to find one.14

“Textuality” and Relationality
Dorothy’s account of how she met Justine opens the novel: “I entered
the strange world of Justine Shade via a message on the bulletin board in
a Laundromat filled with bitterness and the hot breath of dryers. ‘Writer
interested in talking to followers of Anna Granite. Please call —.’ It was
written in rigorous, precise, feminine print on a modest card displayed
amidst dozens of cards, garish Xeroxed sheets, newsprint, and ragged
tongues of paper” (Two Girls, Fat and Thin, 11). “Textuality” is a literal
feature of their relationship and is linked, from the novel’s first words,
with a dual sense of casualness and fate; an eleven-word ad “displayed
amidst dozens of cards” hardly seems to augur a life-altering event, but
then again, what are the chances that the writer of the “index card” and
the writer in the index card will be read by someone who both reads index
cards in laundromats and happens to be among the former “followers of
Anna Granite.” Dorothy draws out the connection between fortuity and
accident by saying, somewhat crankily, “The owners of this laundry
establishment seem to have an especially lax policy when it comes to the
bulletin board, and upon it any nut can advertise himself.” For a moment
it doesn’t matter that Dorothy happened upon the “modest card”; it only
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matters that she almost didn’t. Bemoaning the clutter of idiosyncratic
longing, Dorothy’s indignation reflects her discomfort with offhanded
characterizations of Granite and meaningfulness generally. However,
whereas Dorothy is indignant and overwhelmed that intimacy is mediated by “index cards” and “bulletin boards,” Berlant is buoyed to find that
getting to know Sedgwick by reading each other’s books is “one place
where the impersonality of intimacy can be transacted without harm to
anyone” (126).
Elaborating on Berlant’s formulation, I consider how “textuality” is not
only a pattern of interacting through texts but a model for relating to each
other as texts. I develop the term “textuality” to provide a non-hermeneutic
account of psychological engagement. Instead of using “textuality” as a
paradigm for all interpretive activity (as some branches of hermeneutics
have),15 I suggest that relationality is amplified when we consider that
interpretive reading is not the only way to engage a text. As Laplanche has
masterfully shown, within Freud’s metapsychology there is no logical
explanation of how unconscious sexuality originates. For Freud, it seems
good enough to say that sexuality becomes a “drive” somewhat supernaturally, by being either an inborn feature of every psychic system or the
sudden but inevitable outgrowth of infant development. But as Laplanche
has persuasively shown, Freud’s conflation of “instinct” and “drive” leads
to a deeply problematic misunderstanding of how enlarged sexuality
works. Describing this theoretical problem, Laplanche writes, “Instinct is
hereditary, fixed, and adaptive; it starts with somatic tension, has a ‘specific action’ and a satisfying object, and leads to a sustained relaxation of
the tension. In contrast, drive in the pure sense would not be hereditary,
nor necessarily adaptive. The model of source, aim, and adequate object
cannot easily be applied to the drive. I have insisted more than once,
notably in relation to the idea of ‘source,’ that if one can say with any rigor
that the anus is the source of anal drive, then one must question with
even greater rigor how one could ever maintain that the drive to see,
voyeurism, aims at lowering something that one could call ‘ocular tension.’ ”16 We know that instinctual life is predetermined by biology and
we also know that adult sexuality is a fact of psychological experience
but, within psychoanalytic metapsychology, we have no way of understanding how we get from basic, hardwired instinctuality to enlarged,
unconscious sexuality.
Laplanche shows that in the absence of a logical explanation for how
“drive” originates, Freud resorted to Lamarckian ideas about the phylogenetic transmission of universal psychic fantasies. That is, unable to explain
how certain powerful emotional experiences developed in the individual,
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Freud relied on the idea that ancestral social events could bridge the gap
between “ancient interpersonal experiences and the universal underlying
features of internal psychic structure,”17 and that, when it came to “drive”
sexuality, every individual acquired erotic interests out of some mysterious endogenous process. This move—from external events to internal
reactions—was always Freud’s particular talent; as noted earlier, he distinguished psychoanalysis from the therapeutic endeavors of Charcot
precisely in this way, making subjective experience more psychologically meaningful than any particular traumatic event. However, while
this move was extraordinarily successful in shining a light on a vast range
of internal experience, it nearly immediately resulted in a well-worn philosophical problem, which was how then to account for the role of the
outside world, and of the other person? As the psychoanalysts Stephen
Mitchell and Jay Greenberg have observed, classical drive/structure theories echo the “highly individualistic, atomistic tradition of Locke and
Hobbes in British political philosophy”(30) wherein “man cannot live
outside society, but society is in a fundamental sense inimical to his very
nature and precludes the possibility for his deepest, fullest satisfactions.”18
While in the Anglo-American tradition, relational theory has ventured
to remedy the psyche’s atomism by dispensing with drive altogether
and instead reorienting psychology toward the interpersonal context,
Laplanche takes a different approach that retains sexuality as the primary
object of psychoanalysis but fundamentally transforms our understanding of how it works.
To do this, Laplanche situates the emergence of “drive” in the communicative exchanges between the adult and child. Emphatically rejecting
Freud’s efforts to make “drive” the spontaneous outgrowth of instinctual
life, Laplanche instead suggests that we view sexuality as the inevitable
result of the mind’s developmental process, which is fundamentally dependent on the other/adult person. The fact of this dependence is extremely
important for Laplanche insofar as it establishes a channel for the exchange
of material between adult and child. Why is it so important for a channel
to exist? Because, as Laplanche will show, once you have a mechanism
for transmitting information between an adult and a child, then you also
have a way of explaining where “drive” sexuality originates—which is in
the unconscious of the adult. According to Laplanche, seduction names
the fact that in order to survive, the human infant depends upon the
adult as a caretaker but that this caretaker, who is an adult, also has an
unconscious of his own. While in and of itself this statement hardly
seems that radical, what Laplanche goes on to describe is the impact—on
the child—of encountering the adult’s unconscious sexuality. Specifically,
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that when faced with the adult’s sexuality, the infant sets about to “translate” what she is picking up on. Why? Because to the infant, experiencing the adult’s unconscious sexuality is an affective event. Laplanche
writes, “It is only because the adult’s messages are compromised by his
sexual unconscious that, secondarily, the child’s attempts at symbolization are set in motion, where the child actively works on material that is
already sexual.”19 Although Laplanche does not ever explicate how
“translation” or “symbolization” work at a technical or biopsychical
level, our contemporary understanding of affect enables us to fill in the
blanks. That is, viewed in terms of affect, unconscious sexuality can be
understood to be areas of the adult’s psychic life that have not been
worked on by language or symbolization, meaning they are raw and
largely unprocessed. While the adult may be undisturbed by what he
doesn’t consciously feel, the child has a different experience. For the
child, repeatedly confronting large batches of unprocessed affect
prompts regulatory action, propelling the child to diminish the intensity of incoming affect by setting to work on the material, “translating”
it into images, fantasies, symbols, and so on. It is precisely this process
of “translation” that establishes “drive” sexuality in the child. Understood functionally, affect is therefore able to explain what no theoretical
program could explain without it—the development of unconscious
sexuality. Laplanche calls this sequence of events the “Fundamental
Anthropological Situation,” by which he means that it is “the truly universal relation between a child who has no genetically programmed
unconscious (‘genetically innocent’) and an adult (not necessarily the
mother) who, psychoanalysis tells us, is inhabited by an unconscious. It
is a situation that is absolutely ineluctable, even if the infant has no parents, and even if he is . . . a clone!”20
Laplanche outlines a profound and original hypothesis about how
what propels psychological becoming is simultaneously forceful and enigmatic, external and nowhere we could know. This depiction of how the
subject is constituted by its necessary response to an-other’s desire is crucial for what I call “questions” because it foregrounds how the forces that
shape object-relating have to do with being compelled by “messages” that
a subject bears but did not generate on his own. Even more importantly,
Laplanche’s paradigm of unconscious sexuality challenges the popularity
of projection as the dominant mechanism of interpsychic communication by showing how one person’s psychological effects on another person
are never as straightforward as the drama of misrecognition suggests.
That is, if we take seriously Laplanche’s insistence on the other person
being an “other” to himself, then it becomes practically impossible to
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declare, as Berlant does, that what I respond to in the other person is only
ever what I put into him. The problem with reducing all the complexity of
dynamic relationality to the linear plot of transference is that “everything
is constructed from the center, all mechanisms are conceived with, as
subject, the person in question.”21 “Is it possible,” Laplanche asks, “for us
to succeed in this intellectual conversion, this unimaginable ‘version’? to
abandon the centrifugal arrow, free ourselves from the idea that everything is already in Pierre’s pouch” in which we continue to imagine that
“everything would be in the internal ‘convenience store,’ and would be
reduced to the simplistic question of ‘moving the inside to the outside’ ”
(226). What if instead of this classical model, we began to understand that
each person—having been a “translator” of his parent’s unconscious
“messages” since infancy—has a store of “questions” that are susceptible
to reactivation by any new person he meets?
If having one’s “questions” reactivated by someone else’s “questions”
sounds like science fiction, that isn’t incidental to Nabokov’s effort—
through webs of fortuities that stretch realism’s range—to complicate the
representation of reality’s operation. We can observe a similar project at
work in Gaitskill’s text in the form of Dorothy as someone whose hyper-
vigilance about connections and deeper meanings often seems desperately superstitious and vaguely paranoid. For example, after discovering
the fateful “index card,” Dorothy says: “When I woke in the afternoon, I
called ‘writer’ again. Again, no response. Instead of relief, I felt irritation.
Why had this person put his/her number on a bulletin board if he/she
didn’t have a machine to take calls? . . . ‘Writer’ had sent a quivering
through my quotidian existence, and now everything was significant”
(15). Even though Dorothy’s exaggerated responses seem like they would
automatically undermine her narrative credibility, Gaitskill’s text instead
consistently frustrates and disorients the distinction between Dorothy’s
acuity and her self-deception. After finally reaching Justine and arranging
their first interview, Dorothy says, “I invented possible scenarios daily,
growing more and more excited by the impending intellectual adventure”
(17). This sounds like the kind of inflated imaginative reverie we come to
expect from Dorothy until suddenly Dorothy’s description aligns exactly
with the story the novel will tell: “My wildest invention, however, didn’t
prepare me for what actually happened. . . . I had thought of Anna Granite as the summit of my life, the definitive, devastating climax—and yet
perhaps she had only been the foreshadowing catalyst for the connection
that occurred between me and Justine, the bridge without which our
lives would have continued to run their spiritually parallel courses” (17).
By positioning Dorothy as the indefatigable apostle of life’s mysterious
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underpinnings (and not just the deluded counterpart to Justine’s jagged
skepticism), the novel appoints Dorothy as the occult’s eccentric beholder,
whose perspicacity accurately captures the strange-yet-ordained quality
of transformation.

Transformation and Relating
Dorothy’s vivid depictions of her encounter with Granite are especially
striking for their contrast with the scripted, impatient manner she has for
talking about anything else. Consider the juxtaposition between the
matter-of-fact style in which she reports having “been forced to have an
incestuous affair with my father, starting at age fourteen” (26) with her
recollection of first discovering Granite: “I read Anna Granite and suddenly a whole different way of looking at life was presented to me. She
showed me that human beings can live in strength and honor. . . . And
then the rest was just . . . the sheer beauty of her ideas . . . she held up a
vision for me, and her vision helped me through terrible times. I mean, by
the time I discovered Granite, I had just about given up” (28). Unlike the
other moments where Dorothy dutifully and begrudgingly itemizes her
traumas, this description of Granite is the first time Dorothy sounds narrative. Whereas trying to answer the interview questions felt coarse and
unintuitive—at one point Dorothy even says, “I regarded Justine with dislike and awaited her next prepackaged question” (32)—talking about
Granite recreates the aura of romance and transformation.
In her descriptions of discovering Sedgwick, Berlant imitates Dorothy’s narrative arc when she says, “Eve Sedgwick’s work has changed sexuality’s history and destiny. She is a referent, and there is a professional
field with a jargon and things, and articles and books that summarize it.
For me, though, the luck of encountering her grandiosity, her belief that
it is good to disseminate the intelligent force of an attachment to a thing,
a thought, a sensation, is of unsurpassable consequence” (“Two Girls, Fat
and Thin,” 122). When later in the essay Berlant offers an account of how
it is that another person can effectuate such impactful transformation, the
concept of “emancipatory form” is introduced to suggest that, “in the spectacularly alien capacity to absorb a person, to take her out of her old way
of being whether or not she finds a place elsewhere,” the “emancipatory
form does not require a particular content but instead the capacity to be
both surprised and confirmed by an attachment of which one knows little” (141). Non-specificity is an essential feature of the “emancipatory
form” because what the subject experiences as transformative isn’t anything “particular” about the object per se, but “in the spectacularly alien
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capacity to absorb a person, to take her out of her old way of being.”
Transformation is a version of absorption, and given the immense burden of Dorothy’s traumatic past, it is no wonder that, according to Berlant, “the most thematic but not least dramatic instance of this double
movement is in Dorothy’s encounter with Granite.”
Privileging the formalism of a transformative event is crucial to understanding what people do to have and hold onto their optimism, but in the
commitment to “deshame fantasmatic attachments” there is a wholesale
flattening of relational forms into things that have value despite their
“particular content.” Working against the critical tendency to devalue and
dismiss the subject’s strategies for “staying afloat,” Berlant’s essay seeks to
redeem the silly or sentimental cathexis by demonstrating that fantasy-
based attachment is on a spectrum of projective need, not a symptom of
the proletariat’s errancy. The twofold implication here is that fantasy is the
universal mechanism of everyone’s object relations (everyone does it) and
it is the common ground for all different kinds of object relations (every
relationship is equally fantasmatic). An interpretive model that takes the
subject’s self-alienation as presumptive opens up innumerable possibilities for being curious and compassionate about all that compels us
toward/away from each other and ourselves. But then what is the specificity of being transformed as a process of becoming-different? Here I think
we can begin to perceive a non-difference, in Berlant’s account, between
“absorption” as a technique for managing anxiety and pain versus “relating” as the connection to an object that enables psychic change. In fact,
extrapolating from this conflation of absorption with relating, it is as
though all attachment becomes functionally identical to any other compulsion for managing distress. Can individuals use objects outside overdetermined circuits of meaning? This seems indisputable to me. And
where in doubt, Berlant’s oeuvre resolutely shows that pleasure and relief
are not derived from necessarily “coherent” or “appropriate” activities.
But how can we make the leap from this observation to the notion that
there is no difference between being absorbed and being transformed
because an identical mechanism underlies both—a need getting met—
unless we consider transformation as somehow dissociable from psychic
relating?
Indeed, Berlant insists on severing the association between “partic
ular content” and “emancipatory form” even as the novel and essay
proliferate evocative glimpses of barely symbolized, non-conscious, non-
representational “communication” between each set of girls. Dorothy
describes the power of Granite as “the first writer, ever” who “showed me
that human beings can live in strength and honor, not oppositional to it”
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(27). Berlant replicates the rhythm of this scene when she says of Sedgwick’s work, “To admit your surprising attachments, to trace your transformation over the course of a long (life) sentence, is sentience—that’s
what I’ve learned” (“Two Girls, Fat and Thin,” 122). Here and elsewhere,
scenes of learning refer to something specific about the object-as-teacher
that makes a given interchange transformative. And yet, when Berlant
conflates “absorption” and “relating” it is because “a poetics of misrecognition” redescribes all attachment as motivated by the projection upon
the object of a fantasmatic need. In his theory of the “mirror stage,” Lacan
uses the child’s experience of registering the disjunction between his
“unorganized jumble of sensations and impulses” and the reflection of a
“unified surface appearance similar to that of the child’s far more capable,
coordinated, and powerful parents”22 to demonstrate the subject’s foundational self-estrangement, the impossibility of aspiring to a True self and
the comedy of encountering, in every other, a self that is always already
mediated by fantasy. Using Lacan’s formulation, Berlant writes that, “Misrecognition (méconnaisance) describes the psychic process by which fantasy recalibrates what we encounter so that we can imagine that something
or someone can fulfill our desire: its operation is central to the state of
cruel optimism. To misrecognize is not to err, but to project qualities onto
something so that we can love, hate, and manipulate it for having those
qualities—which it might or might not have” (122). The subject of this
scenario attempts to get what it needs and what it needs is, ultimately, to
manage confusion and get some relief. There can be a diversity of objects
who provide this and a multiplicity of means, but the need to “imagine
that something or someone can fulfill our desire” is the subject’s most
elementary wish.
Berlant treats the “poetics of misrecognition” as an analytic formulation that, despite their slightly different critical investments, she and
Sedgwick both share. According to Berlant, “Sedgwick seeks to read every
word the subject writes (she believes in the author) to establish the avowed
and disavowed patterns of his or her desire, and then understands those
repetitions in terms of a story about sexuality that does not exist yet as a
convention or an identity. . . . The queer tendency of this method is to put
one’s attachments back into play and into pleasure, into knowledge, into
worlds. It is to admit that they matter” (123). But “my world,” Berlant
writes a few paragraphs later, “operates according to a proximate, but
different, fantasy of disappointment, optimism, aversion, and attachment than the one I attribute to Eve.” Berlant avers that “this distinction
is not an opposition” because, “like Eve, I desire to angle knowledge
toward and from the places where it is (and we are) impossible. But
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individuality—that monument of liberal fantasy, that site of commodity
fetishism, that project of certain psychoanalytic desires, that sign of cultural and national modernity—is to me a contrary form. . . . There is an
orientation toward interiority in much queer theory that brings me up
short and makes me wonder: Must the project of queerness start ‘inside’
of the subject and spread out from there?” (125). To illustrate this point
biographically, even though “in writing this way I am working against my
own inclination,” Berlant writes:
My story, if I wrote it, would locate its optimism in a crowded scene
too, but mine was dominated by a general environment not of thriving
but of disappointment, contempt, and threat. I salvaged my capacity to
attach to persons by reconceiving of both their violence and their love
as impersonal. This isn’t about me. This has had some unpleasant
effects, as you might imagine. But it was also a way to protect my optimism. Selves seemed like ruthless personalizers. In contrast, to think
of the world as organized around the impersonality of the structures
and practices that conventionalize desire, intimacy, and even one’s
own personhood was to realize how uninevitable the experience of
being personal, of having a personality, is. (125)
In what might otherwise be a heartbreaking glimpse of a terrifying childhood, Berlant insists instead that the subject’s capacity to survive and
the quality of her object-relating are not, necessarily, linked. This breach
between attachment and personhood anticipates the disconnection
between particular objects and impacted subjectivity that Berlant asserts
is fundamental to every transformative relation. Moreover, by applying
“this isn’t about me” to object relating tout court, and transformative
encounters especially, Berlant uses her interpretation of what transpires
between two sets of fat and thin girls to prove that transformation is not
about getting “personal”—because look at all the ways these women do
not know or even care about each other—and subjectivity is not about
being transformed—because motivation and the interiority it fabricates is
a psychological and hermeneutic luxury for those who aren’t simply desperately trying to “stay afloat.”
What “staying afloat” shares with the “poetics of misrecognition” is a
conceptualization of what constitutes the subject’s basic needs. But this
idea of the subject who relates by fantasmatically conforming the outside
object to his internal needs depends upon the assertion that biological
self-preservation and psychological growth are structurally and economically identical and moreover, that psychic development works the
way eating does. Laplanche vigorously warns: “We must refuse to believe
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in the illusion that Freud proposes. From the hat of hunger, from a self-
preservative instinct, Freud the illusionist claims to produce the rabbit of
sexuality, as if by magic. This is only possible if sexuality has been hidden
somewhere from the start.”23 While the experience of being fed and the
mirror stage are different developmental moments, Laplanche identifies
how both fables share the modeling of all psychic need on the mechanism
of alimentary satisfaction. Because for Laplanche, the satisfaction of
needs (milk) is always part of someone else’s sexuality (breast), the notion
that adult desire is autocentric, conscious, or necessarily even aligned
with self-preservation belies the fact that there never was an object who
was only or simply the provider of alimentary needs. Even the “provider”
had a psychology that, while dispensing food, was also “enigmatic” and
whose enigmas demanded the subject’s “translation” and response. Therefore, whereas “self-preservation” (eating) works according to a principle
of pleasure (satiety and the reduction of tension), the “drive” denotes a
force that is “not goal-directed,” “variable from one individual to the
next,” “determined by the individual’s history,” and that works according
to a principle of excitation (increase in tension).24 Because the drive “is
bound to fantasy, which for its part is strictly personal,” Berlant’s insistence that desiring transformation is governed by the principle of “self-
preservation” (survival) is incoherent to the extent that transformation is
a product of the subject’s fantasmatic life as constituted by relating to others. Transformation is not a basic need that can be efficiently met but a
function of an idiosyncratic psyche pursuing becoming. Asking why an
individual would attach to things that militate against flourishing presumes that somehow flourishing is dissociable from attachment. But
while this construct makes sense within a Marxist frame, in a psychological one there is no way to separate what’s in a subject’s “interests” from
the objects of attachment; the “interest” of the subject is survival and
attachment is the means. “Cruel optimism” risks tautology by using psychological principles to redescribe a problematic those same principles
presume.

Fat vs. Thin, Personal/Impersonal
Gaitskill uses this “fat/thin” distinction aesthetically and descriptively
to denote the different psychic and environmental textures of each girl’s
experiential world, and in her essay Berlant elaborates this imagined
juxtaposition by grafting onto “fat” and “thin” literal distinctions between
her and Sedgwick (Sedgwick writes about being fat, Berlant talks about
her asceticism) and conceptual ones, between personal and impersonal,
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biography and anti-biography, attachment and detachment. This overarching categorization meditates on fat/thin as a difference of relational
intensity that is concretely expressed in each girl’s relationship to the pedagogic object at the novel center: Dorothy is over-identified with Granite,
imitative, infatuated, evangelical, while Justine is skeptical of Granite,
journalistic, curious, interested in writing about her but not in becoming an actual acolyte. And so, although both “fat” and “thin” represent
modes of impersonality, they each also figure for notably different relational tendencies, such as: Dorothy/Sedgwick/Fat = voracious, entitled,
outstretched vs. Justine/Berlant/Thin = aloof, apart, contained. (Insisting
on relating and what my relating might mean, I think, though I’m skinny,
we know whose company I’m in.) What is suggestive about Berlant’s metaphoric framing of relational styles in metabolic terms is that it consigns
relationality to a spectrum of “greater” or “lesser” degrees of aggression
(grandiosity) and demand (projection), the result of which is that Justine
behaves fantasmatically and Dorothy tends to make-believe. However,
the novel and essay contradict the classification she constructs: Not only
are both girls compelled by Granite, even if Justine seems impassive and
Dorothy feels cosmically ordained, but both the novel and the essay
depend, for their existence, on thin girls trying to be intimate with what
fat girls say they love.
The implications of this fat/thin distinction are not limited to analyses
of each girl’s fantasmatic range, but serve, in Berlant’s essay, to characterize
the different appetitive profiles of critical interpretation. Although the
essay begins by sketching her and Sedgwick’s “different, but proximate”
fantasies of personhood, and Berlant assures us that this “distinction is not
an opposition,” the essay progresses by systematically collocating possible
avenues to psychological meaning, then dispersing them onto an all-
exterior landscape of un-interpretable sensation and non-comprehensible
events. If the subject is only ever fumbling and stumbling and trying to
survive with a bare minimum of optimism intact, then attributing behavior to interiority and interpreting what motivates sexual or “textual” desire
already aspires to explain over-meaningfully; as if trying to understand
the subject in psychological terms becomes itself a sign of critical greed.
Or critics more wounded and austere would never even be that hungry.
Although Berlant’s suggestion to be less hungry critics, or at least to
train ourselves to evacuate whatever “meaning” we ingest, complemented
the discourse’s direction as one that focused its interpretive energies on
adumbrating the “thresholds, tensions, blends and blurs” and rejecting
the big “compartmentalisms” of subject/object, representation, memory,
time/space, and so on—it also enabled psychoanalysis to retain its status
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as the absolute explanatory paradigm of human behavior by ratifying
“transference” as the preeminent mechanism of object-relating. If, beyond
insinuating that opposite body types attract because they are symbolically
complementary, Berlant’s essay cannot account for what brings these girls
together, it is because when everyone is a “ruthless personalizer,” what
motivates contact is not much deeper than how well (or badly) the other
serves one’s own projective longings. This uncritical reduction of all relating to “transference” and projection preserves psychoanalysis’s ideology
of the autocentric subject and, in doing so, simplifies intimacy and transformation precisely where queer theory seemed uniquely poised to complicate it.
Since the concept’s debut in Freud’s early writings to the contemporary
proliferation of diverse typologies, “transference” has become the ur-
mechanism for how subjects experience each other as familiar objects.
Initially, Freud defined “transference” as “new editions or facsimiles of
the impulses and fantasies that are aroused and made conscious during
the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity . . . that they
replace some earlier person by the person of the physician.”25 No matter
what brand of transference it is (sexual, negative, Oedipal, narcissistic,
and so on), certain key features are consistent: Temporality moves forward and/or backward, shuffling between present, past, and future tenses;
the directionality of affect flows only from inside and toward outside, in
varying permutations of projection and identification; fantasy and need
are the main impulses for transporting affect between objects even if
other mechanisms like the body or landscape function interactively as
well. As we will see, it is impossible for transference to be used without
invoking a specific ideology of affect whereby fantasy originates in me
and gets projected onto you. The word “transference” itself, with the root
verb “transfer” describing the movement of something in someone to
someone/thing somewhere else, bears the trace of the concept’s particular
genealogy in classical Freudian psychoanalysis where transference represented the patient’s affective “resistance” to the “talking cure.” Although
the term’s antagonistic dynamics have been notably softened by the
development of a “two-person” framework, I argue that no matter how
brazenly contemporary clinicians insist on increasing the ratio between
neutrality and the reality of an interpersonal context, the philosophical
foundations of transference retain the infrastructure of a psychic subject
whose experience originates in a monolithic historical past that gets reimposed on an otherwise innocent relational present.26 Indeed, Sedgwick’s
mobilization of Tomkins’s affect theory is directed at dethroning Freudian/Lacanian metapsychology at exactly the point where psychoanalytic
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formulations reduce subjectivity to a crude relational determinism and
psychobiology. By showing that affects motivate, Sedgwick uses Tomkins
to show that new possibilities emerge for interpreting the subject’s
experience. How, then, can we understand the totalizing reductiveness
by which what happens between “two girls” becomes no more than a
transferential event, the formal effect of the general wish each girl projects “for something transformative”?
As a critique of individuality—“that monument of liberal fantasy, that
site of commodity fetishism, that project of certain psychoanalytic desires,
that sign of cultural and national modernity”—Berlant’s impersonality
would seem, nearly automatically, to demand the dissolution of the autocentric subject. However, by conflating all of psychology with (available/
interior) consciousness, and flattening all relating into need-based projection, Berlant corroborates transference and its enforcement of psychoanalysis’s most persistent and totalizing myths: that transformative
relating is exogenous to the constitution of subjectivity. As an argument,
Berlant’s use of her relationship to Sedgwick, and Dorothy’s relationship
to Justine, to prove that relating does not need to be personal to be transformative, depends for its cogency on conflating biography with psychology, but they are not, after all, the same thing. In fact, it is precisely the
tension between them that animates and challenges the critic’s interpretive task. As such, while defending the subject’s rights to incoherence is a
vital hermeneutic precept, limiting the subject’s psychological processes
to originating “basic” needs and meeting them consolidates the subject’s
absolute, autarkic role. What about becoming-different as a form of relating irreducible to “getting by” or ontogenesis? After all, a girl whose compulsions we can’t read and a girl whose compulsions have no meaning are
two different things. Ruth Leys’s seminal critique of affect theory’s “anti-
intentionalism”27 echoes this chapter’s observation that “a materialist theory that suspends considerations of meaning or intentionality in order to
produce an account of the affects as inherently organic (indeed inherently
mechanical) in nature”28 is necessarily committed to an idea of emotions
as “inherently objectless” so that, even though “I laugh when I am tickled,”
“I am not laughing at you.” Laughing, but “not at you” helpfully demonstrates how affect theory’s “anti-intentionalism” is practically contingent
upon, and responsible for, a non-relational metapsychological framework. To extrapolate even further from these observations, I would suggest that the compatibility of Lacanian metapsychology with a Deleuzian
ontology of immanence and non-representational theory occludes affect
theory’s depsychologization of relationality because linguistic structuralism effectively materializes psychic action into generalized “forms” that
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are beyond personal, relational or concrete “content.” I think it is a specific kind of formalism that is organized against the content of anything
“personal” about the object or relation that enables Berlant to claim that
what is transformative is the self ’s “impersonal,” non-
psychological
attachment to the object, not something—however imperceptible or non-
representational—that happens between them.

“Resonance” and Relationality
Perhaps the measure of how far affect theory moves us toward a new
vocabulary for describing relational experience while simultaneously circumscribing the theoretical range of what it will capably radicalize is evident in the different ways “resonance” can be understood. Berlant uses
“resonance” to characterize the sensation Dorothy and Justine experience
when they first meet: “At the time of their meeting, neither Justine nor
Dorothy has had a good conversation with anyone in many years. . . . Yet
from the moment of their initial phone call they resonate with each other,
a resonance that they take personally but that has, in a sense, nothing to
do with anything substantive about each other” (127). “Resonance” recurs
often in affect theory and in the phenomenological thought influenced
by Merleau-Ponty, offering, as it does, a term for signaling a “felt” occurrence that is not necessarily assimilable into linguistic representation or
more concrete signification. I want to suggest that in order for each girl
to function “formally” rather than “substantive[ly]” for each other, for
“formalism” to be juxtaposed to “content” in this way, we also have to
imagine that the “resonance that they take personally” can be physiological without being psychological, or, put another way, that in order to
be perceptual, meaning has to be perceptible, too. But Merleau-Ponty
uses “perceptual meaning” in a functionally similar way to Laplanche’s
“psychic reality”—to denote an alternative logic of development that is
simultaneously constitutive of subjectivity and relationality, irreducible
to biological or linguistic reductionism, singular and not-me, singular
because I am where I respond to the other. If it is through the self ’s movement in relation to others that a self develops, then “resonance” is an
exemplary encounter with movement as being-moved that is not necessarily accessible to signification.
Therefore, whereas “resonance” within an applied Lacanian model
merely complements the affective topography of an ultimately transferential event, in a Laplanchian-
inflected formulation of relational
encountering, “resonance” is how the impact of a transformative “textual” engagement becomes registered, non-meaningfully. This means that
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we can “resonate” with an other even though we cannot know what or
why or even how—only that we are resonant and, because our knowledge
is embodied, because “textuality” lives in our gestures and glances, our
resonance means even if we will never know what it means. This “resonance” that happens between subjectivities is not, then, a narrative
moment where form exceeds or supersedes content, but a psycho-
physiological instant that attunes me to my “textual” self, and to myself
as “textual.”
I have used “textuality” to refer to the questions (Laplanchian “messages”) that propel transformative “relating” and “textual desire” to the
need/wish to experience these questions as questions. What I want now
to add to this formulation is the mechanism that links these two concepts,
something Laplanche calls “reactivation”:
The translation of the enigmatic adult message doesn’t happen all at
once but in two moments . . . in the first moment, the message is
simply inscribed or implanted, without being understood. It is as if
maintained or held in position under a thin layer of consciousness,
or under the skin. In a second moment the message is reactivated
from within. It acts like an internal foreign body that must at all
costs be mastered and integrated.29
The psychic mechanism Laplanche outlines makes it possible to imagine
relationality as an experience of one’s own “messages” being “reactivated”
by the “messages” of another. What distinguishes this model from what
Laplanche often refers to as the “trans-individual structures” of Lacanian
“language,” or the fantasmatic activity of Kleinian “projection,” is that only
a specific, concrete other whose “messages” resonate with my own can provoke the “reactivation” of my “untranslated” questions. This is the reality
of the “message,” i.e. of the “signifier as it is addressed by someone to
someone.” According to Laplanche, “to project, to introject, to identify, to
disavow, to foreclose etc.—all the verbs used by analytic theory to describe
psychical processes share the feature of having as subject the individual in
question: I project, I disavow, I foreclose, etc. What has been scotomised
. . . quite simply, is the discovery that the process originally comes from the
other. Processes in which the individual takes an active part are all secondary in relation to the originary moment, which is that of a passivity: that of
seduction.”30 It is no longer possible to think psychic life archeologically
because development is mediated by the concrete “other,” and what the
child bears as “knowledge” is only ever already a product of how “enigmatic” content has been idiosyncratically “translated.” With this, Laplanche
offers a way out of “transference’s” determinism because there is no unified
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or legible scene that could be wished-for or repeated—only implanted
“messages” shot through with affect and signification that in their exigency
compel us toward we know not what, or whom.

Two Girls, Relational and Queer
This chapter suggests that Two Girls is an exemplary dramatization of
how relationality unfolds in non-hermeneutic, non-teleological, indeterminate ways, for not only is Dorothy’s response to Justine’s “index”-card
call for “followers of Anna Granite” literally an answer to Justine’s question about Granite, but Dorothy’s relationship to Granite is something
that, for whatever reason, Justine wants an occasion to live with (and
through) for a while. Why else would Justine want to write about it? And
even then, why interview ex-acolytes? This is not an attempt to deduce
unconscious motivations but instead to insist we take seriously the conditions that bind any of the girls writing or being written about “two
girls.” This means that we cannot treat as narrative coincidence that these
two girls are brought together on either side of Granite (a teacher) and
Definitism (a movement compelled by the search for Truth), even if it
looks as though the intimacy between someone detachedly curious and
someone who cathects heroically is reducible merely to the structural
drama of a thin girl experiencing proximity to a fat one. Because even
when the manifold effects of this “comic méconnaisance” seem weird and
queer and enigmatic, sadly, the motivational mechanisms that underlie it
never are. For although putting each girl’s desperate, justifiable need for a
transformative object at the center of their encounter suggests that phenomenological rawness proves attachment has been stripped unsentimentally down to the bone, it only really strips attachment of the complexity
that renders it any kind of relationship whatsoever.
While the biographical data we’re given is at once too limited and conventional to explain their respective attraction to Definitism or each
other, the novel seems decidedly more provocative as an exercise in rendering, as links, the possible knots of psychic entanglement that it could
sketch but barely, if ever, begin to untangle. Therefore, insofar as “resonance” aims to describe the powerful, mostly nonlinguistic and non-
representational, relational current connecting psychic subjectivities to
each other, I want to read the ending as the beginning the novel has been
working its way to elaborating. The ending is therefore not only, “not
nothing,” but radical because it isn’t any kind of ending at all but rather
a singular moment of elaboration, where the “sonorous” sense of “resonance” “can only emerge little by little, and no doubt with difficulty,”
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halting and halted in a holding embrace, where the force undergirding
their “resonance” emerges and can glimpse something of what “resonance”
would look like if it never had to assume a relational form. Whereas for
Berlant, this ending resists categorization by being ambiguous, I want to
read this ending as the concrete expression of a “resonance” these girls
have experienced in relationship to each other from the beginning.
In her essay’s countermanding conversion of all meaningfulness into
abstraction, Berlant valorizes their inscrutable “falling asleep” by ignoring that Dorothy interrupts Justine during an S/M scene, which, in a
novel this bracingly deliberate, we have to consider as being about more
than just salvation from violence (they’ve each had so much of that
already) and instead about the ways their complimentary, enigmatic
“questions” dramatically intersect. For Justine, this final S/M scene marks
an escalation of the danger/pleasure ratio she has been testing throughout the novel. While Dorothy spends the novel attempting to regulate her
desire by idealizing then denigrating her objects, Justine tries outsmarting her detachment by finding a viable spot between terror and indifference. Although each girl is preoccupied privately and outside any dialogue
they’re explicitly having, the novel’s trajectory plots them on parallel
paths that converge when they experience their struggles in relation to
each other. Of course, to every thin girl sureness looks big, and to every
fat girl deprivation needs saving. But calling this a relational dynamic is
not identical to a conventional love plot. We need terms for distinguishing relationality from structures of compulsory kinship—otherwise all
attachment is effectively heterosexual and all relationality automatically
non-queer.

What Do Teachers Have to Do with “Two Girls”?
I doubt it is incidental that pedagogy brings all these unlikely pairs of
girls into each other’s orbit. While at first, Dorothy and Justine each perform rituals of projective appetitiveness that can make their cathexis to
Anna Granite seem like the desperate attachment of students onto the
teacher-hero as empty form, as the novel progresses we observe the way
they circle and evade each other as if they are each compelled to keep
sharing something. This isn’t what happens to two girls in spite of their
history but what happens between them because of it. Indeed, not only is
Gaitskill’s novel a story of “two girls” who meet through a teacher, and
not only is Berlant’s essay an account of what she learned and “Professor
Sedgwick” taught, but Berlant’s essay itself begins, and ends, with a sentence—“history is what hurts”—from her own teacher’s text. Although
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Fredric Jameson is nowhere situated as her teacherly interlocutor, Berlant
implicitly avows the essay’s pedagogic context when, in addition to her
opening riff, “history hurts, but not only” (121), she later adds: “Here is a
stupidity of mine: ‘History is what hurts,’ that motto of The Political
Unconscious, is a phrase that I love. It resonates as truth; it performs a
truth-effect in me. But because it is in the genre of the maxim, I have
never tried to understand it. That is one project of this essay” (126). Again
there is “resonance”—this time between Berlant and something she loves
of what her teacher has said. And what is that “phrase I love” without ever
“try[ing] to understand it” but her own teacher’s idea of history’s relation
to subjectivity, genre, and trauma, a theory of transformation and impact
that she distills her own meditation on traumatized subjectivity in relation to?
For that matter, what is that sentence from Jameson she calls “a stupidity of mine” but precisely a knowledge that she just does not yet “understand” because before she has a chance to intervene, it “performs a
truth-effect in me?” Berlant blames the sentence’s formalism for obstructing her access to critical self-reflection: “Because it is in the genre of the
maxim,” she says, “I have never tried to understand it.” But isn’t it actually
the “genre” of pedagogy that makes this motto feel so unavailable to critique? For if teacher-
student relationality has no phenomenological
integrity that can’t eventually be reduced to the hysterical relay of impersonal projections, then endeavoring to elaborate one’s own textual objects
has no recourse to engage a material, specifiable other. Indeed, her account
of “a phrase that I love” is surrounded at every turn by references to its
mystical genealogy, as if attachment can be either sensible or magical, legible or stupid, desperate or depressive. But if pedagogy is the condition of
Berlant’s attempt to push against what she calls her “stupidity” while writing about someone else from whom she’s learned, and pedagogy is the
context of Dorothy’s initial struggle to become a girl who is not her
father’s daughter, a project she begins with Granite and resumes in relation to another girl’s learning, it may be because resonating with the question another person asks is the only way to reactivate “messages” that I
have, but have no access to?
What I think this means is that teachers are not those we learn from
by “overthrowing”—besides, rage against temporal difference seems far
more like the aging father’s problem than the younger son’s. But rather, we
learn from those who help us survive our questions by inviting us into
their own. Since resonances are partial and non-meaningfully known,
difference is constitutive of attachment, not its retributive form. As such,
if the pedagogic relation is so essential to every iteration of “two girls” it
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is because pedagogy cannot be reduced to merely another non-specific
psychic mechanism of survival-by-any-projective-means necessary. Relationality is not only what happens in the suspension and disorganization
of genre—a formulation that ultimately reifies social categorization by
locating potentiality in materiality’s elusive “elsewhere.” Relationality is
how “textuality” becomes transmissible and transformed. While contemporary critical and literary theory proliferates generative and rich possibilities for how subjectivity can be non-symptomologically experienced
and expressed, it maintains a distinctly more limited imagination about
what happens between subjects who are not only structural placeholders
for abstract psychic functions but concrete others carrying “enigmatic
messages” that “resonate” and compel. Insofar as relationality requires a
methodology that foregrounds between-ness epistemologically, we need
a metapsychology that can wonder how strangers reach and turn away
from each other, how Two Girls is about what happens between two girls,
and how it is what’s elaborated between girls that is potentially transformative for each girl. To the extent that “history” is not only what “hurts,”
it is in no small part because of whom we meet and what, because of who
they are, we find transformable, and transformed, about ourselves.
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